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STRUCTURE AND PROPORTIONALITY OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN PSI RE-USE*
by
RADIM POLČÁK
This recommendation is about legal regulatory framework of fundamental rights
involved in the re-use of public sector information and about the method of imple-
mentation of these rights in secondary EU law. It is particularly focused on sub-
sidiarity and proportionality of EU law and the ways in which the differences in
understanding of mutual balance of fundamental rights with regards to PSI re-use
on the level of EU, CoE and in Member States, affect the efficiency of the Directive.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Developing any legal regulatory framework is always a matter of mutual
balancing of fundamental rights as well as balancing of fundamental rights
and public interests. This policy recommendation contains an overview of
these rights and interests including links to policy recommendations that
elaborate on them in particular. It is assumed that there is no general classi-
fication of fundamental  rights and public interests and that their  mutual
conflicts have to be assessed on an ad hoc basis.
With the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, complete structure of funda-
mental rights has been acknowledged as an integral part of primary EU law.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice then joins already existing jurisdic-
tions of ECHR and national supreme and constitutional courts of the Mem-
ber States, so this policy recommendation identifies and describes the issue
that is referred to as “Bermuda triangle,” i.e. the situation when there exist
* This text was originally published as the LAPSI WG 6 policy recommendation, redrafted to
the date of 21 October 2012.
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three  relatively  independent  regimes  of  the  protection  of  fundamental
rights. Consequently, legal issues of fundamental rights might be now si-
multaneously decided by three relatively independent instances. Diversities
in these cases are likely to occur due to the fact that the understanding of
mutual balance of fundamental rights and of the balance between funda-
mental rights and public interests is different on the level of EU, CoE and in
the Member States and often arises from cultural differences.
In order to tackle the above issues, this document offers three main rec-
ommendations, i.e.:
1) to treat  proportionality of the Directive apart from its subsidiarity,
i.e. to specifically assess and reason the purpose of EU regulatory
action (i.e. the subsidiarity of the Directive) and the scope of partic-
ular provisions (i.e. the proportionality of particular rules).
2) to particularly analyze conflicting fundamental rights in PSI re-use,
to subsequently identify diverse approaches to these rights arising
from cultural diversity among the Member States and
3) to exclude strict provisions in the Directive that relate to these di-
versities, i.e. to leave the issue of mutual balancing of fundamental
rights and of balancing of fundamental rights and public interests
in  these  cases  for  the  inter-institutional  discourse  between  the
CJEU,  ECHR  and  supreme  judicial  institutions  of  the   Member
States.
2. INTERESTS INVOLVED - PURPOSE OF THE DIRECTIVE AND 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN PSI RE-USE
The legal basis (legitimate purpose) of the Directive is primarily grounded
in  Article  26  of  the  Treaty  on  the  Functioning  of  the  European  Union
(TFEU). The development of an “area without internal frontiers in which
the  free  movement  of  goods,  persons,  services  and  capital  is  ensured”
served in this case through Article 114 TFEU as a legitimate legal basis for
the adoption of harmonization measures for re-use of public sector informa-
tion throughout the EU.
The core teleology of the Directive, i.e. the development of internal mar-
ket through the harmonization of rules for re-use of public sector informa-
tion is based on the following assumptions:
1) data represent key element in the knowledge economy (e.g. recital,
paragraph 3)
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2) public sector produces data that, if made available for re-use, repre-
sent large economic potential (e.g. recital, paragraph 5)
3) state-of-the-art  information and communication technologies  pro-
vide for extensive tools for processing and utilizing digital data in-
cluding  public  sector  information  (e.g.  recital,  paragraph 4),  and
that 
4) unified transparent regime for re-use of public sector information
among the Member States will multiply positive economic effects of
re-use of public sector information (e.g. recital, paragraph 6, 7, 8).
Disparities in the laws of Member States hinder the development of
an internal market for PSI based products and services.
The primary aim of the Directive is to create an economically functional
legal environment for transparent and non-discriminatory use of those pub-
lic sector information that is made available for further fructification1. It im-
plies that, out of the three general aims of law, i.e. fairness, certainty and
utility (economic efficiency)2, the core teleology of the Directive is primarily
based on economic efficiency. It does not mean that the Directive may not
bring other than economic positive effects, but that the economic efficiency
of the internal market basically justifies its mere existence.
It was not the primary aim of the Directive to promote non-economic so-
cial or political benefits.  If any positive social  effects were originally pre-
dicted or supported by the directive, like the enhancement of fundamental
informational  rights  (right  to  knowledge,  freedom of  research  etc.  –  e.g.
recital,  paragraph 16)  or  common goods  (transparency and efficiency  of
public institutions,), they are to be tackled as accompanying effects to the
primary economic benefits3. However, it does not mean that other than eco-
nomic effects should be disregarded or neglected – although they do not
primarily legitimate the mere existence of the Directive, they significantly
contribute to the development of democratic information society4.
1 For detailed discussion of economic factors in PSI re-use, see Position Paper No. 1 „Prin-
ciples governing charging“ for re-use of public sector information.
2 See Radbruch, G. 1957, Der Mensch im Recht: ausgewählte Vorträge und Aufsätze über
Grundfragen des Rechts, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, p. 88.
3 The primary focus of pan-European economic efficiency is typical not just for public sector
information but for EU law in general – see for example Trachtman, J. L'Etat, C'est Nous.
1992,  'Sovereignty,  Economic  Integration  and  Subsidiarity',  Harvard  International  Law
Journal, vol. 33, no. 2, p. 459-473.
4 See para. 16 of the recital: „Making public all generally available documents held by the
public sector — concerning not only the political process but also the legal and administrat-
ive process — is a fundamental instrument for extending the right to knowledge, which is a
basic principle of democracy. This objective is applicable to institutions at every level, be it
local, national or international“ or Position Paper 4: The “Licensing” of public sector in-
formation, p. 3.
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In  its  recently  conducted  impact  assessment  study,  the  Commission
identified the following problematic issues in adoption and implementation
of the Directive5:
1) Insufficient clarity and transparency, including practical issues,
2) Licensing terms that are restrictive or unclear, or lacking altogether,
3) Lack of information on available data,
4) Lack of a robust complaints procedure,
5) Locked resources,
6) Excessive charging and lack of a level playing field, including at-
tempts by public sector bodies to maximise  cost recovery, as op-
posed to benefits for the wider economy,
7) Unfair  competition  practices  between the  public  and the  private
sector,
8) Incoherent approach within and across the Member States,
9) Ineffective enforcement mechanisms.
All above points derive from extensive analysis of practical (in)efficien-
cies of the recent implementation and application of the Directive. They pre-
vent  the  Directive  from  establishing  functional  (i.e.  comprehensive,  effi-
cient, transparent and predictable) market of public sector information and
of its derivatives6. Consequently, all the problems mentioned above repre-
sent constraints or limitations whose removal is desired in order to make
the Directive work. That is desirable with regards to the main teleology of
the Directive (i.e. of economic efficiency), but also with respect to a multi-
tude of consequent social benefits, i.e. transparency of public sector, devel-
opment of non-profit social services etc.
Apart from aforementioned constraints, there is a need to consider an-
other factor that represents serious risk to the efficiency of the Directive, i.e.
the compliance of the Directive and its implementations with primary EU
law, constitutional law and international law. If, for example, re-use regula-
tions provide for rights or remedies that might be (even theoretically) chal-
lenged in front of the Court of Justice, national constitutional instances or in
front of the European Court of Human Rights, it can lead not just into the
implicit lack of their theoretical legitimacy, but also into very particular un-
certainty as to their mere practical application. That means substantial con-
5 See SEC(2011) 1552 final, p. 8.
6 The overview of the current market situation is given in WG 1 Policy recommendation on
the competition law issues of the re-use of public sector information, p. 3.
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straint to particular business projects and initiatives due to the lack of pre-
dictability of law.
Taking into account that superior rules (primary EU law, constitutional
law of the Member States, public international law) are to a large extent de-
fined upon fundamental rights, it is of crucial importance to focus on the
compliance of the Directive and its subsequent requirements with their re-
cent discourse.  In order to analyze and discuss the ways in which the EU
PSI re-use addresses the protection of fundamental rights, there is a need to
first identify those fundamental rights that are most important with the re-
spect to the re-use of PSI. Although the following list is not exhaustive, it
provides for a structure of fundamental rights within which there exist most
of recent legal issues arising from PSI re-use. The purpose of the following
list is not to explain what fundamental rights are or should be tackled by
the Directive, but to rather point out which fundamental rights are to be in
general taken into account with regards to the re-use of PSI:
Freedom of  information or  freedom of  access  to  information (in  some lan-
guages  translated  as  “right  for  information”  or  “right  to  access
information”) – this right has been identified by the project team as highly
important for PSI re-use, yet the most controversial7.  Its doctrinal  under-
standing as well as its interpretation greatly differs among various jurisdic-
tions8. Some of Member States consider it only as access right towards pub-
lic institutions, while other  doctrines  use it  as common denomination for
broad variety of  individual  information rights including  rights to receive,
create,  process  and  disseminate  various  kinds  of  information.  Conse-
quently, when used in broader sense, freedom of information might contain
also rights related to the freedom of expression, freedom of press, freedom
of scientific research and even freedom of thought or freedom of religion9.
Right to privacy (incl. right for private and family life) - this right forms an
integral part of a set of individual information rights commonly denomi-
nated as rights  for  information self-determination10.  Unlike in the case of
7 See Birkinshaw, P. 2010, Freedom of Information – The Law, the Practice and the Ideal,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,  p. 30 or Balkin, J.  M. 2004, Digital  Speech and
Democratic Culture: a Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society. New
York University Law Review, vol. 79, no. 1, p. 1-55 or Borgman, C. 2003, From Gutenberg to
the global information infrastructure, MIT Press, Cambridge, p. 63.
8 See also WG6 Recommendation No. 2 on Rights of Access to Public Sector Information, p.
10.
9 See for example Balkin, J. M. 2004, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: a Theory of Free-
dom of Expression for the Information Society. New York University Law Review, vol. 79,
no. 1, p. 1-55.
10 The complex term „right for information self-determination“ has been first used by the Ger-
man Constitutional Court in its decision No. BVerfGE 65, 1, of 15-12-1983, publ. on-line at
www.thm.de/datenschutz/images/stories/volkszaehlungsurteil_bverfger_1983.pdf.
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freedom of information rights, the international understanding of the scope
and definition of the right to privacy are now relatively settled.  Thus, it is
possible to work now among various jurisdictions with relatively unified
terminology and concerted understanding as to the scope and relevance of
this right11. It is to be noted that the right to privacy consists not just of its
passive fundament (i.e.  of the right  for  protection of private sphere),  but
also of its active component, i.e. of the right to actively communicate incl.
the right to access services of information society assuming that private life
does not include only discretional private sphere, but also private forms of
social interaction.
Right to the protection of personal data – deriving originally from the right
to privacy, the right to the protection of personal data aims to specifically
protect one element of individual personal integrity, i.e. data related to an
individual person. However, the scope, method and procedures of protec-
tion of personal data substantially differ from the protection of privacy12.
Unlike in the case of privacy protection,  personal data are  objectively de-
fined and the basic protective method is primarily grounded in administra-
tive law. Also unlike in the case of privacy protection, there is complex EU
legal regulatory framework for the protection of personal data13.
Right to property – the right to property represents one of core elements of
European legal culture14.  However, when assessing its role and relevance,
there is a need to clearly distinguish between the standard property rights,
i.e. tangible and intangible property, and intellectual property. Unlike in the
case of  movable and immovable property, intellectual property is  neither
significantly grounded in the European legal history, nor it has fully settled
as to the structure and  use of various  protective instruments.  Apart from
historical differences, there are also no solid rational, social, ethical or eco-
11 The development of internationally concerted understanding of the content of this right was
driven also by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights  -  see for example
ECHR no. 13710/88 (Niemietz v. Germany) no. 5029/71 (Klass et al. v. Germany, no. 9248/81
(Leander v. Sweden), no.11801/85 (Kruslin v. France), no. 23224/94 (Kopp v. Switzerland),
no. 44787/98 (P. G. and J. H. v. UK), no. 30562/04 and 30566/04 (S. and Marper v. UK), no.
28341/95 (Rotaru v. Romania) and others. Recently, this right is being tackled in the light of
highly controversial issue of data retention – see for example de Vries, K. Bellanova, R. De
Hert, P., Gurwith, S. The German Constitutional Court Judgment on Data Retention: Pro-
portionality Overrides Unlimited Surveillance (Doesn’t it?), in Gutwirth, S., Poullet, Y., De
Hert, P., Leenes, R. (eds.), 2011, Computers, Privacy and Data Protection: An Element of
Choice, Springer, Heidelberg, p. 3.
12 See Schwartz, P.M. 2004, 'Property, privacy, and personal data', Harvard Law Review, vol.
117, no. 7, pp. 2055-2128 on page 2069 or Kuner, C. 2003, European Data Privacy Law and
Online Business, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 55.
13 See WG 2 Recommendation on and Personal Data protection, p. 1.
14 See Glenn P. 2004, Legal Traditions of the World, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 125 or
Wood, A. 2008, Kantian Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 85.
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nomical  grounds for equalizing those two categories15.  Consequently, the
role and relevance of intellectual property and (standard) property have to
be considered independently, whereas the PSI re-use agenda works namely
with the intellectual property rights16.
Right to conduct business – acting in favour of free business activities, this
fundamental right is often a subject to the assessment against rights of pri-
vacy, freedom of speech etc.17 The right to conduct business is often not di-
rectly defined by fundamental sources of black-letter law, but it is applied
as a consequence either to the right of property or to the right to work (or
both).  The  right-to-property-based  interpretation  of  the  right  to  conduct
business derives from philosophical position that sees the entrepreneurship
basically as a property of economically usable tools. It is then considered as
a property right of the owner of these tools not to be disturbed in using
them in order to gain economic benefits. On the contrary, the right-to-work-
centered approach to the freedom to conduct business focuses on the free-
dom to choose the occupation including the freedom of self-employment.
Regardless of what are the grounds for the recognition of the freedom to
conduct business in national legal systems, this fundamental right plays an
important role in the re-use of PSI. It relates to quantitative (antitrust) pro-
tection of the PSI market18, state-subsidized commercial activities relating to
PSI as well as to the qualitative protection of fair competitive business envi-
ronment19.
Right to equal treatment – this fundamental right represents one of core
principles of law in general20. It derives from very grounds of human-cen-
tered system of law and is based on the assumption that all human beings
deserve the same treatment with respect to their rights and duties. How-
ever,  practical  applicability  of  this  principle  might  become  problematic
when it comes to the question of so-called criteria of distinction. It is there-
15 The fact that the right to the protection of intellectual property is now recognized as a part
of the structure of fundamental rights (incl. Its expressis verbis presence in fundamental
constitutional documents) does not mean that its relevance or forms of protection shall be
the same as in the case of tangible property. See Lessig, L. 2004, Freeculture. The Penguin
Press, New York.
16 See the Position Paper 4: The “Licensing” of public sector information, p. 9.
17 See  for  example  Fundamental  Social  Rights:  Case-Law of  the  European Social  Charter,
Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2002, p. 13 or ECHR case No. 25181/94 (Hertel v. Switzer-
land).
18 These rights are elaborated in detail in WG 1 Policy recommendations on the competition
law issues of the re-use of public sector information.
19 This includes also the protection of valuable information like trade (business) secrets – see
WG 6 Policy recommendation regarding the interface between the protection of commercial
secrecy and the re-use of public sector information.
20 For comparative approach, see for example Rabe, J. 2001, Equality, affirmative action, and
justice,  Books on Demand, Nordested, p. 163 or Smith, R. K. M. 2007, Textbook on Interna-
tional Human Rights, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 235.
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fore not that difficult to legislatively provide for equal treatment for various
sorts  of  subjects,  but  it  might  be  often  difficult  to  specify  what  features
make these subjects equal in the light of the applicable law. In the PSI re-use
agenda, the right to equal treatment becomes emerging namely with respect
to distinguishing among PSI re-users and among public bodies.
Public interests – although public interests (public goods) do not repre-
sent per se fundamental rights, they are to be recognized as equally relevant
to them21.  Acknowledging the crucial  relevance of public interests is  rea-
soned not just by natural teleology of public institutions, but also by the fact
that the level of protection of public interests consequently affects the level
of protection of fundamental rights of individuals - only functioning public
institutions (i.e. those that have enough powers and resources) might be ef-
ficient  enough  in  promotion  and  protection  of  individual  fundamental
rights.  In  the  area  of  PSI  re-use,  the  most  emerging  public  interests  are
namely economical effects  lato sensu incl. GDP, employment, development
of the internal market, more efficient use of public funds etc. followed by
various positive social effects incl. the development of information society,
enhancement of scientific progress, environmental protection, protection of
public health etc22. While these interests act in favour of greater level of PSI
re-use, other public interests that are to be considered as well,  might act
contrary to that, namely the protection of public economic or political inter-
ests (by, for example, the secrecy of some economic information), and the
protection of public security.
The above enumerated fundamental rights and public interests get often
into mutual conflicts. For example, freedom of information contradicts with
the right to the protection of personal data whenever there are some per-
sonal data contained in the PSI23, public interests in economic and social de-
velopment might often contradict with the property rights etc. The leading
European doctrine in assessing the conflict of fundamental rights is the doc-
trine of balancing of rights. Primarily developed for general assessment of
21 See for example Kiesling, J. H. 2000, Collective Goods Neglected Goods, Singapore: Word
Scientific Publishing, p. 29 or Sheraing, C., Wood, J. 2003, 'Governing Security for Common
Goods', International Journal of the Sociology of Law, vol. 31, p. 212 or Solms, S. H. 2009, In-
formation Security Governance, Springer Media, New York, p. 23 or Reich, P.C., Weinstein,
S., Wild C., Cabanlong A.S. 2002, 'Cyber Warfare: A Review of Theories, Law, Policies, Ac-
tual Incidents - and the Dilemma of Anonymity', European Journal of Law and Technology,
vol. 2, no. 1, p. 31.
22 See for example WG6 Recommendation No. 2 on Rights of Access to Public Sector Informa-
tion, p. 3.
23 See examples in WG 2 Recommendation on and Personal Data protection, p. 4.
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conflicts of legal principles by R. Alexy24 and subsequently by R. Dworkin25,
this doctrine that was implemented into Article 51(1) of the Charter nowa-
days offers practically usable method for the resolution of hard cases (com-
plicated interpretational issues) of conflicting fundamental rights and has
been in numerous cases practically adopted by national supreme judicial in-
stitutions, ECJ as well as by the ECHR.
3. SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY OF EU LAW WITH
RESPECT TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
It is to be noted that this text uses the terms “subsidiarity” and “proportion-
ality” in their meanings in the doctrine of EU law26. Consequently, they are
referred to as principles of co-existence of EU law in relation to national le-
gal regulatory framework of the Member States.
By their definitions, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are
relatively simple. They have been explicitly present as key principles of Eu-
ropean integration since the middle of 70ies27 and they reflected the nature
of  the  European Communities  as  primarily  cooperative  international  en-
tity28. While the principle of subsidiarity relates namely to the scope of the
regulatory activities, the principle of proportionality limits the availability
of particular institutional competences29.
In the words of the applicable primary black-letter law, the EU level of
lawmaking is appropriate in cases where, apart from areas where the EU
has exclusive competences, the “objectives of the proposed action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States30.”  At the same time, the exer-
cise of regulatory competences of EU institutions shall not exceed the limits
as to what is “necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties31.”
24 See Alexy, R. A. 2004,Theory of Constitutional Rights, Oxford University Publishing, New
York, p. 44.
25 See for example Dworkin, R. 1974, 'Non-Neutral Principles', The Journal of Philosophy, vol.
74, no. 14, pp. 491-506.
26 See for example Craig, P., de Burca, G. 2011, EU Law: Texts, Cases and Materials, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, p. 168 or Harbo, T. I. 2010, 'The Function of the Proportionality
Principle in EU Law', European Law Journal, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 158-185.
27 See for example Schultze,  R. 2009, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing
Structure of European Law, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 243 or Van Kersbergen,
K.,  Verbeek, B. 1994, 'The Politics of Subsidiarity in the European Union',  vol. 32, no. 2,
Common Market Law Review, pp. 215-236.
28 See Bermann, George A. 1994, 'Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
Community and the United States', Columbia Law Review, vol. 331, pp. 332-456 or Inman,
R. P., Rubinfeld D. L. 1998, 'Subsidiarity and the European Union', NBER Working Paper
No. 6556.
29 See for example Toth, A.G., 1992, 'The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty',
Common Market Law Review, vol. 29, pp. 1079-1105.
30 See Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union.
31 See Article 5(4) of the Treaty on European Union.
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The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are not directly related
with the concept of fundamental rights. They do not apply to individual
rights,  but rather to structural relations between different levels of social
regulatory mechanisms32. Consequently, there is theoretically no direct rela-
tion between the discourse in fundamental rights and the discourse in struc-
tural situation between regulatory bodies of EU and of the Member States.
In other words, greater unification or greater loosening of regulatory and
executive competences of the EU should theoretically be of no significance
as to the structure and content of fundamental rights.
However, as pointed out above, the structure and content of fundamen-
tal rights is primarily resulting from immediate understanding of their mu-
tual balance. The decision as to the right mutual relevance of various funda-
mental rights is always made in specific historical, social, cultural and eco-
nomical circumstances. It is then crucially important for the mere content of
fundamental rights what circumstances are taken into account for that dis-
course. Consequently, it can make substantial difference if the balance be-
tween fundamental rights is considered from the pan-European perspective
or if it is made on the level of a Member State or even on lower levels (re-
gions, municipalities etc.)33. For example, it might substantially differ as to
the above circumstances if  a conflict  between freedom of expression and
right to privacy is considered by the Court of Justice,  European Court of
Human Rights, constitutional court of a Member State or even by a district
court in some European region (moreover, it would probably make signifi-
cant  difference  if  that  district  court would be located in  some district  of
Spain, Finland or Bulgaria).
The Directive clears the issue of subsidiarity by stating that “the objec-
tives of the proposed action, namely to facilitate the creation of Community-
wide information products and services based on public sector documents,
to enhance an effective cross-border use of public sector documents by pri-
vate companies for added-value information products and services and to
limit distortions of competition on the Community market, cannot be suffi-
ciently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, in view of the in-
trinsic Community scope and impact of the said action, be better achieved
at Community level.” The specific value of harmonized pan-European regu-
32 See  Bermann, George A. 1994, 'Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
Community and the United States', Columbia Law Review, vol. 331, pp. 332-456.
33 See Maccormick, N. 1997, 'Democracy, Subsidiarity, and Citizenship in the European Com-
monwealth', Law and Philosophy, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 331-356.
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latory approach to re-use of PSI is emphasized also in the Proposal, whereas
the main objective of the proposed changes is reasoned by a need “to facili-
tate the creation of Union-wide products and services based on PSI, to en-
sure the effective cross-border use of PSI for value-added products and ser-
vices, to limit distortions of competition on the Union market, and to pre-
vent the deepening of disparities among Member States in dealing with the
re-use of PSI.” 
Compared to  the  issue  of  subsidiarity,  the  issue  of  proportionality  is
tackled relatively briefly in the Directive, in the Proposal and in the accom-
panying Impact Assessment. All the aforementioned documents are based
on the assumption that the need of unified EU-level regulatory approach
that reasons the subsidiarity of the regulatory action also implies the im-
plicit proportionate need for the exercise of the competences of EU. This as-
sumption,  however,  is  not  entirely  correct  with  regards  to  fundamental
rights.
The issue of proportionality with regards to fundamental rights is in this
case closely related to extraordinarily complicated problem of substantive
and institutional  plurality of the protection of fundamental  rights in  Eu-
rope34. The situation where the protection of fundamental rights is defined
by at least three materially equal regulatory regimes, i.e. EU, CoE and na-
tional laws, generates unique substantive and institutional discourse. None
of the aforementioned regulatory frameworks is ultimately supreme to one
another  and consequently,  institutional  background of  each  of  the  three
above regulatory levels is working in relative independence on one another.
Theoretically, it is possible to have one matter diversely decided by a na-
tional constitutional court (or similar superior national  instance), Court of
Justice and European Court of Human Rights, while each of such decisions
might be final and irreversible. This situation is referred to as the European
Bermuda triangle and results into substantial uncertainty as to the interpre-
tation of basic balance of fundamental rights35.
It is obviously neither the aim nor the ambition of this policy recommen-
dation to resolve the substantive or institutional plurality (or multi-centric-
ity) of the protection of fundamental rights in Europe. However, the fact
that there is neither unified nor certain regime of the protection of funda-
34 See Carozza, P. 2003, 'Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights
Law', The American Journal of International Law, vol. 97, no. 1. pp. 38-79.
35 See Pernice, I. Kanitz, R. 2004, Fundamental Rights and Multi-Level Constitutionalism in
Europe, WHI-Paper 07.
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mental rights has to be pointed out especially with regards to the issue of
proportionality of the EU law, because it implies that, simply said, propor-
tionality of EU law cannot be directly implied from its subsidiarity.
If the substantive and institutional plurality in approaching of the bal-
ance of fundamental rights is not respected in any of participating regula-
tory regimes, it might result into institutional conflicts similar to those that
arose with the data retention36. In that case, the EU regulatory action was
taken without acknowledging the fact that the EU-level of the assessment of
the mutual  balance of fundamental  rights (or  of  fundamental  rights  and
public interests) in this case differs from national understanding of such a
balance in some of the Member States37. As a result, supreme instances in
these Member States were forced to declare their diverse opinions on the
balance of fundamental rights upon which the EU-level regulatory action
(or its subsequent national implementations) practically lost its primary reg-
ulatory effect38.
However, the problem of institutional plurality with regards to the pro-
tection of fundamental rights is not critical39. As Europe is in its social and
political grounds relatively coherent, substantial differences as to the assess-
ment of balance of fundamental rights relate only to exceptional issues that
arise from particular cultural differences. Therefore, there is for example no
difference among the Member States as to the balance of fundamental rights
with regards to the capital punishment, but there are differences in the same
kind of assessment as to the abortions or euthanasia.
In the light of the above facts, it is important for the assessment of sub-
sidiarity and proportionality of any EU regulatory action to identify not just
the fundamental rights at stake, but also to map areas where their mutual
balance (or their relations to public interests) might be understood differ-
ently in different Member States. Whenever these differences of cultural di-
versity among the Member States arise, they have to be considered as seri-
ous factual limit to proportionality of EU law and need to be addressed ac-
36 See for example Crump, C. 2003, 'Data Retention: Privacy, Anonymity, and Accountability
Online', Stanford Law Review, Vol. 56, no. 1. pp. 191-229.
37 See for  example Haggerty,  K.  D.,  Samatas,  M. 2010, Surveillance and Democracy,  Rout-
ledge, London, p.152.
38 See for example de Vries, K. Bellanova, R. De Hert, P., Gurwith, S. The German Constitu -
tional Court Judgment on Data Retention: Proportionality Overrides Unlimited Surveillance
(Doesn’t it?), in Gutwirth, S., Poullet, Y., De Hert, P., Leenes, R. (eds.), 2011, Computers, Pri-
vacy and Data Protection: An Element of Choice, Springer, Heidelberg, p. 3 or Feiler,  L.
2010, 'The Legality of the Data Retention Directive in Light of the Fundamental Rights to
Privacy and Data Protection', European Journal of Law and Technology, vol. 1, no. 3.
39 See for example WG6 Recommendation No. 2 on Rights of Access to Public Sector Informa-
tion, p. 16.
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cordingly. In that sense, it is crucially important to identify cases when the
EU-level of understanding of mutual balance of fundamental rights (i.e. the
understanding that is generated by democratic discourse within EU institu-
tions) substantially differs from particular members states.  Typical  exam-
ples of such situations include cases of mutual balance between privacy, ac-
cess rights or intellectual property rights.
The following parts of this recommendation will focus on the ways in
which fundamental rights involved in re-use of public sector information
are  protected under  the  current  EU regulatory  framework and on areas
where subsidiarity and proportionality of EU law with regards to the pro-
tection of fundamental rights might be challenged.
4. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ADDRESSED IN THE DIRECTIVE
As noted above, the structure of fundamental rights that naturally form the
background of regulatory framework of PSI re-use include:
• Freedom of information
• Right to the protection of privacy
• Right to the protection of personal data
• Right to property
• Right to conduct business
• Right to equality
This chapter provides for a summary of ways in which the above funda-
mental rights are now being tackled by the Directive and/or by other com-
ponents of PSI-related acquis.
Freedom of information or Freedom to access information - The provisions of
the Directive do not include any specific duties as to mere making of PSI
available for the re-use. Therefore, the freedom of information stricto sensu is
being protected on the EU-level only in general by Article 42 of the Charter
focusing only on EU institutions and then by particular provisions of na-
tional laws of the Member States. These national provisions differ greatly
among each other as to their scope, requirements and institutional backing.
Consequently, there is at the moment neither any common understanding
nor concerted practices among the Member States as to the general scope
and content of freedom of information.
As to the particular access rights, the current EU regulatory framework
covers only environmental information (through Directive 2003/4/EC of the
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European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public access
to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EEC).
Not primarily aimed at access rights, but using access rights as one of its
components  are  the  regulatory  frameworks  of  spatial  data  (Directive
2007/2/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2007
establishing an Infrastructure for Spatial Information in the European Com-
munity  (INSPIRE)  and  other  particular  initiatives  that  are  in  progress
namely with the development of European eJustice portal, e.g. the proposal
for the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending
Directives 89/666/EEC, 2005/56/EC and 2009/101/EC as regards the intercon-
nection of central, commercial and companies registers40.
4.1 FREEDOM TO CONDUCT BUSINESS AND RIGHT TO 
EQUALITY
These two fundamental rights are particularly protected by the Directive in
the way of straightforward implementing the principle of non-discrimina-
tion. The Directive aims at creating transparent and non-discriminatory reg-
ulatory environment for PSI re-use by implementing strict ban on the adop-
tion of new exclusive agreements into the Article 11(1).  Article 11(3) then
provides for compulsory invalidity of exclusive agreements that were made
before the Directive came into effect. The only exception to the principle of
non-discrimination, i.e. the only exception with regards to the ban on exclu-
sive agreements, is allowed in Article 11(2) upon factual conflict with public
interests.
Despite of the fact that the ban on exclusive agreements represents one
of relatively very few particular strict rules of the Directive, its recent practi-
cal effects are disputable. The study that was carried out by the European
Commission in accordance with the Communication (COM/2009/0212 final)
on the application on Re-use of Public Sector Information – Review of Direc-
tive 2003/98/EC – for Belgium, Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Poland,
Spain, Italy, France and Germany showed that although the Member States
have harmonized  their  national  laws with  the  anti-discriminatory  provi-
sions of the Directive, there is evident lack of efficient enforcement.
40 The question of whether and eventually in what form should the freedom of information be
expressly legislated in the Directive is being tackled in particular in WG 6 Recommendation
No. 2 on Rights of Access to Public Sector Information, p. 20.
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4.2 RIGHT TO PRIVACY, RIGHT TO THE PROTECTION OF 
PERSONAL DATA
The Directive does not focus on privacy protection. Instead of that, the Di-
rective makes references to the regulatory framework for the protection of
personal  data.  Paragraph  21  of  the  recital  points  out  that  the  Directive
should be implemented and applied “in full compliance with the principles
relating to the protection of personal data,” whereas Article 1(4) reads in the
way that the Directive shall not affect in any way “the level of protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data under the provi-
sions of Community and national law, and in particular does not alter the
obligations and rights set out in Directive 95/46/EC.” 
In that respect, it might be found a bit disputable to which extent does
the  Directive  in  fact  affect  existing particular  protective  rules.  While  the
recital speaks about compliance with “principles,” Article 1(4) mentions nei-
ther principles, nor rules, but “level of protection.” However, taking into ac-
count the basic teleology of the Directive, it is relatively clear that the pur-
pose of Article 1(4) is to prevent the Directive from acting as lex posterior or
lex specialis in the relation to the existing acquis and national laws on the pro-
tection of personal data41.
4.3 RIGHT TO PROPERTY
The right to property is expressly protected by the Directive namely with
regards to copyright and sui generis rights. The recital uses in paragraph 22
similar wording as in the above case of the protection of personal data say-
ing that “intellectual  property rights of  third parties  are not  affected” as
well as that the Directive “does not affect the existence or ownership of in-
tellectual property rights of public sector bodies.” However, Article 1(2)(b)
of the Directive does not only provide for the sanctity of intellectual prop-
erty rights of third parties, but directly exempts PSI with third party rights
from the scope of the applicability of the Directive. This is disputable not
only with regards to the nature of the right to property (i.e. to the fact that it
has no a priori priority over other fundamental  rights),  but also with re-
gards to general diversity as to the understanding of the scope and content
of this right. As it was pointed out by the CoE Handbook, “when the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”) was being drafted,
41 See WG 2 Recommendation on and Personal Data protection, p. 2.
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the states were unable to reach an agreement. The formulation eventually
adopted by the first Protocol provides a rather qualified right to property,
allowing the State a wide power to interfere with that right.”42
Compared to  another  fundamental  information  right  specifically  pro-
tected by the Directive, i.e. to the above right to the protection of personal
data, the effect of the protection of intellectual property rights through the
escape clause in Article 1(2)(b) is very different, because any third party in-
tellectual property rights automatically provide for a reason to exempt the
respective  PSI from the applicability of the Directive and consequent na-
tional laws as such43.
5. BASIC LEGAL ISSUES IN SUBSIDIARITY AND 
PROPORTIONALITY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN PSI RE-
USE – THE NEED FOR A LEGISLATIVE ACTION
The new primary regulatory framework of the EU substantially differs with
respect to fundamental rights compared to the situation at the time of the
adoption of the Directive. The complete structure of fundamental rights is
now present in the primary EU law what means that the jurisdiction of EU
institutions now implicitly includes fundamental rights to their full extent.
Consequently, it is not necessary to explicitly mention fundamental rights
as governing regulatory ideas for particular legislative initiatives, because
the full structure of fundamental rights is now implicitly present in any sec-
ondary legislation through the primary EU law.
It is difficult to assess or even to predict the total effect of the presence of
full structure of fundamental rights in primary EU law. In any case, the full
presence of fundamental rights in the primary EU law provides the EU and
its  institutions  with  materially  the  same substantive  scope of  rights  and
obligations with regards to their protection as it exists at the Member States
and at the Council of Europe.
However, the present approach of the EU institutions towards compli-
cated issues  arising  from balancing of fundamental  rights has  been rela-
tively  modest,  especially  with  regards  to  the  discretion  of  the  Member
States.  It  happens only  very  rarely  that  the  Parliament,  the  Council,  the
42 See Grćić,  G.,  Mataga,  Z.,  Longar,  M., Vilfan,  A.  2007, The Right to  Property under the
European Convention on Human Rights, CoE Human Rights Handbooks, No. 10, p. 5.
43 Similarly strict is the exclusion of particular subjects or institutions – see for example the
discussion in WG 1 and WG 5 Recommendation as to the issue of the proposed inclusion of
cultural and research institutions in the scope of PSI Directive or the analysis in Position Pa-
per No. 3: The Exclusion of “public undertakings” from the re-use of public sector informa-
tion regime.
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Commission or the Court of Justice would strictly and positively set the re-
quired balance between fundamental rights and enforce the EU-level of un-
derstanding of that balance towards the Member States (one of relatively
very rare exemptions is the above referred case of data retention).  Rather
than that, the EU institutions in most cases leave the decisions as to the very
balance of fundamental rights on the Member States. Consequently, the sec-
ondary EU law does not in regular cases favour one fundamental right over
another and nor does the Court of Justice when deciding on references for
preliminary rulings44. 
For example, the balance between the right to privacy and the right to
the protection of intellectual property has never been explicitly addressed
by the EU legislation or by the Court of Justice in a way that would favour
one or another. Preliminary rulings were mostly issued in the sense that
Member States are neither obliged nor prohibited from favouring one fun-
damental right over another45, what practically gives the Member States the
opportunity to consider that balance in their own cultural circumstances.
It implies that the respect to locally-specific understandings of the bal-
ance between fundamental rights46 practically acts on the EU level as a natu-
ral limit of the principle of proportionality. Even in cases when the EU-wide
unified regulatory approach is found necessary (i.e. the subsidiarity require-
ments are met), the regulatory actions of EU institutions are often factually
limited only to issues that do not strictly affect diverse recent national inter-
pretations of balance between fundamental rights in the Member States47.
The above implies a question as to what extent should the secondary EU
law (and subsequent statutory law of the Member States) set relations be-
tween fundamental rights (or between fundamental rights and public inter-
ests) with regards to re-use of PSI. In a situation when the balance between
these rights is a matter of permanent social discourse and there still exist
fundamental differences between the Member States, strict legislative defi-
nition of priority fundamental  rights with regards to re-use of PSI might
cause  the  EU  institutions  to  unwillingly  enter  the  above  mentioned
44 Particular issues of institutional backing of legal regime of PSI re-use are analyzed in WG 6
Policy Recommendation 2 on Institutional  Backing of  PSI  Re-use (Strengthening institu-
tional support of re-use of PSI).
45 See for example preliminary rulings in cases C-275/06 or C461/10.
46 This can be demonstrated on examples of national approaches to relations between the re-
use rights and protection of personal data - see for example WG 2 Recommendation on and
Personal Data protection, p. 8.
47 See also WG6 Recommendation No. 2 on Rights of Access to Public Sector Information, p.
23.
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Bermuda triangle and to face the same results as in other similar cases (like
in the case of data retention)48.
On the contrary, legislative negligence with respect to the balance of fun-
damental rights might lead to basic practical uncertainty. Even if particular
rules for the re-use of public sector information are defined precisely and
certainly, there can be no practical certainty as to their application if it re-
mains unclear how to generally handle situations when, for example, the
principle of equality contradicts the right for the protection of intellectual
property.
6. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
A) PROPORTIONALITY IN THE RE-USE OF PUBLIC SECTOR 
INFORMATION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SPECIFICALLY, 
I.E. APART FROM SUBSIDIARITY.
It is not sufficient to imply the proportionality of EU-level regulatory ac-
tions in re-use of public sector information solely from the fact that these
regulatory actions meet the requirement of subsidiarity. It implies that not
all EU regulatory actions that meet the requirement of subsidiarity are to be
automatically taken as proportionate, while the disproportionality might in
these cases arise namely from different understanding of balance of funda-
mental rights.
Moreover,  recent  institutional  framework for  the  protection of funda-
mental rights within the EU consists not just of EU regulatory bodies, but
also of supreme judicial institutions of the Member States and of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights – each of them having ultimate jurisdiction.
Consequently, there might simultaneously exist contradictory views on the
proper balance of fundamental rights at the EU, at the Council of Europe
and in each of the Member States.  Such contradictions can consequently
cause  substantial  inefficiencies  in  the  implementation  of  EU  regulatory
framework and can critically harm its overall practical regulatory impact. 
These concerns need to be addressed specifically during the assessment
of  proportionality  (i.e.  apart  from subsidiarity)  of  EU regulatory  actions
namely with regards to their anticipated factual efficiency.
48 Another similar issue apart from the substantive laws is the question of institutional back-
ing and positive or negative conflicts of powers – see WG 6 Policy Recommendation 2 on
Institutional Backing of PSI Re-use (Strengthening institutional support of re-use of PSI).
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B. THERE IS NEED FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF 
CONFLICTING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN PSI RE-USE AND 
FOR SUBSEQUENT IDENTIFICATION OF DIVERSE 
APPROACHES ARISING FROM CULTURAL DIVERSITY 
AMONG THE MEMBER STATES.
The existing inefficiencies  of  the EU regulatory framework of PSI  re-use
might be mitigated if there are identified areas where the basic balance of
fundamental rights is considered substantially differently in different Mem-
ber States. Consequently, strict EU regulatory action might be avoided in
these cases in order to prevent the PSI regulatory framework from entering
the aforementioned Bermuda triangle.
However,  the fact  that there are recently some differences  among the
Member States in considering the balance of fundamental rights with re-
gards to PSI re-use or that it is impossible to define the position of the Mem-
ber States on these issues does not necessarily mean a strict obstacle to the
efficiency  of  EU regulatory  framework and consequent  constraint  to  the
proportionality of EU law - there is a need to avoid EU regulatory actions
only with respect to issues that directly arise from cultural diversity among
the Member States.
C. THERE IS NO NEED FOR EXPLICIT PROVISIONS IN THE 
DIRECTIVE THAT WOULD POSITIVELY OR NEGATIVELY 
DEAL WITH THE BALANCE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN 
THE RE-USE OF PUBLIC SECTOR INFORMATION.
The fact that the complete framework of fundamental rights is now present
in the primary EU law makes it unnecessary or even counterproductive to
explicitly legislatively cover the protection of fundamental rights in the Di-
rective. Moreover, it is questionable whether the presence of strict  provi-
sions relating to fundamental rights in the Directive might not even be con-
sidered illegitimate with regards to the distinction between primary and
secondary EU law. When the complete framework of fundamental rights
forms integral part of the primary EU law, there is no legitimate reason to
legislate their protection in the secondary EU law.
The absence of specific provisions with regards to the protection of fun-
damental rights in the Directive would also provide for more flexible means
of interpretation by national judicial instances and by the Court of Justice
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that would reflect contemporary social and legal discourse. In particular, it
seems inappropriate for the black-letter secondary EU law to totally exclude
issues related to access rights from the scope of the Directive as well as to
strictly exclude the applicability of the Directive to public sector informa-
tion that contain third-party intellectual property rights.
